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PROBLEMS WITH THE 1967 AMENDMENT
TO CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 139
INTRODUCTION
California public policy favors effective settlement of support
and property rights prior to divorce, where divorce is unavoidable.'
Accordingly, California courts recognize and incorporate2 integrated
property settlement agreements' in decrees for divorce. Since 1957,
however, judicial interpretation of integrated agreements4 has re-
sulted in the loss of the original value of the agreement5 and its di-
minished use by attorneys, due to the uncertainty of the law in-
volved.
1 "Property settlement agreements occupy a favored position in the law of this
state and are sanctioned by the Civil Code." Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 624,
177 P.2d 265, 267 (1947). Accord, Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943);
Hensley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 183 P. 445 (1918).
2 "Incorporate," in this article, refers to the inclusion of the agreement in the
judicial decree. "Merge" refers to the effect of incorporation, i.e., upon incorporation
the agreement merges with the decree and becomes an order of the court.
3 There are three types of agreements through which spouses may settle their
rights prior to divorce:
1. Pure Support Settlement Agreement-provides for support and maintenance.
Payments are modifiable by the court, and enforceable by contempt.
2. Pure Property Settlement Agreement-provides for division of property. It is
neither modifiable by the court, nor enforceable by contempt.
3. Integrated Property Settlement Agreement-provides for simultaneous settle-
ment of support, maintenance, and property rights. Originally, payments under the
agreement were not modifiable by the court but were enforceable by contempt.
(1937-1957) Then the remedy of contempt was withheld. (1957-1967) Under the
new amendment to section 139 of the California Civil Code, CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133,
the payments are modifiable in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary,
and are enforceable by contempt.
See Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 624-26, 177 P.2d 265, 267-68 (1947).
4 "Integrated agreements" hereafter refers to integrated property settlement
agreements, and "integrated payments" refers to the payments under the integrated
agreement.
5 The original value of such an agreement was that, "it provided security of
payment for the husband who could plan his affairs in the assurance that his pay-
ments could not be increased by the court; and it provided a secure payment to
the wife together with the assurance that the payments could be enforced by con-
tempt if they were made a part of the judgment." From material prepared for
Herbert E. Ellingwood, Legislative Representative, State Bar of California, Effect of
S.B. 230 on the Integrated Property Settlement Agreement (1967).
COMMENTS
In May, 1967, section 139 of the California Civil Code was
amended to clarify the law for the attorney and permit modification
of integrated agreements and enforcement of payments under such
agreements through contempt proceedings." However, some question
exists as to whether the amendment is unconstitutional as a violation
of article I section 15 of the California constitution,7 in view of the




Originally there were three requirements for an integrated prop-
erty settlement agreement:
1. A provision "that the purpose of the parties is to reach a final
settlement of their rights and duties with respect to both property
and support.. .."I (Finality Clause)
2. A provision "that they intend each provision to be in consider-
ation for each of the other provisions .... ."' (Consideration Clause)
3. A provision "that they waive all rights arising out of the mari-
tal relationship except those expressly set out in the agreement
.... I' (Waiver Clause)
The presence of the above clauses constituted conclusive evi-
dence of an integrated property settlement agreement which could
6 Section 139 reads in part:
"The provisions of any agreement for the support of either party shall be
deemed to be separate and severable from the provisions of the agreement relating
to property. All orders for the support of either party based on such agreement
shall be deemed law imposed and shall be deemed made under the power of the
court to make such orders. The provisions of any agreement or order for the sup-
port of either party shall be subject to subsequent modification and revocation by
court order except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the order of
modification or revocation, and except to the extent that any written agreement, or
if there is no written agreement, any oral agreement entered into in open court
between the parties, specifically provides to the contrary. All such orders of the
court for the support of the other party, even if there has been an agreement of the
parties, may be enforced by the court by execution, contempt, or by such other
order or orders as the court in its discretion may from time to time deem neces-
sary." CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133.
7 "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action . . . unless in
cases of fraud . . . ." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1953).
8 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957).
9 Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal. 2d 820, 825, 313 P.2d 549, 552 (1957). Accord,
Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal. 2d 274, 303 P.2d 539 (1956); Messenger v. Messenger,
46 Cal. 2d 619, 297 P.2d 988 (1956).
10 Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal. 2d at 825, 313 P.2d at 552 (1957).
11 Id.
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not be modified without the consent of both parties. Such an agree-
ment was enforceable through contempt proceedings. 12
The initial problem created by judicial interpretation of the inte-
grated agreement evolved from the fact that payments under such
agreements are not solely for support, but include payment for prop-
erty given or received."3 With respect to this dual nature of the pay-
ments, Mr. Justice Traynor, now Chief Justice, indicated, in 1954,'4
that to the extent that the payments satisfy the legal duty of marital
support and maintenance, 5 they are "law imposed" alimony. 6 To the
extent, however, that the payments represent the division of prop-
erty, they are "negotiated" contractual debts.' 7
This dual nature distinction became important in 1957. At that
time the supreme court decided, in Bradley v. Superior Court," that
because the payments under an integrated agreement represent prop-
erty, are negotiated between the parties, and are contractual debts,
they are not pure alimony and therefore constitute a "debt" with-
in the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.'9
Consequently the payments, though merged in the judicial decree, are
unenforceable through contempt proceedings.
Although Bradley withheld the remedy of contempt when the
agreement was integrated, the decision did not preclude effective
settlement or enforcement through agreement of the parties. Theoret-
ically the parties could still draft an agreement with a provision that
it was a non-modifiable settlement of both property and support, and
stipulate in the agreement that the payments were solely for support
12 Id.
13 E.g., in settlement of support and property rights, the wife may demand the'
house, furniture, car and $100 each month for support. The husband may counter-
offer the house and half the furniture and $200 each month. If the wife accepts and
an agreement containing the requisite clauses is signed, the payments win really
be the $100 for support and an additional $100 in consideration for letting the hus-
band keep the car and half the furniture. (Of course in actual practice it is much
more complicated and less susceptible to division.)
14 Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal. 2d 36, 41, 265 P.2d 873, 876 (1954).
15 CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133. (I.e., upon marriage, the husband is under a legal
obligation to support his wife during their joint lives. If through his own fault, the
husband forces the wife to terminate the relation, thus depriving her of the benefit
of the obligation, the law requires that he pay compensation to her in the form of
alimony.)
16 This term is also used in the new amendment. See note 6 supra.
17 The distinction between "law imposed alimony" and a "contractual debt"
is most important where the remedy of contempt is involved. If the payments are
"law imposed alimony" they are an exception to article I section 15 and are there-
fore enforceable by contempt. See Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 519,
310 P.2d 634, 640 (1957). Accord, Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 733, 72 P.2d
868 (1937); Ex parte Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 23 P. 395 (1890).
18 48 Cal. 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957).
19 See note 7 supra.
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and separate from any property interest. If the parties deleted the
requisite clauses of the integrated agreement, the remedy of con-
tempt could be used without violating the constitutional prohibition.
A further problem was created by judicial interpretation, how-
ever, when the California Supreme Court held that 'the requisite
clauses of the integrated agreement could be implied from the intent
of the parties in spite of the presence of statements that certain pay-
ments were solely for support. In DiMarco v. DiMarco° the husband
agreed to pay the wife "as and for alimony and support money the
sum of $150.00 each month." The agreement contained no mention of
consideration evidencing the consideration clause required for an in-
tegrated agreement. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the par-
ties intended that the agreement be integrated and consequently non-
modifiable and unenforceable by contempt. Mr. Justice McComb
declared that "the inference is clear that they intended an integrated
agreement. It is unnecessary that the parties recite such intent when
the agreement itself makes the intent clear."'"
Following the reasoning set forth in DiMarco, the appellate
courts made similar determinations. In Biagi v. Biagi22 the trial court
held the husband in contempt where the agreement did not contain a
consideration clause and stated that the money was to be paid "as ali-
mony." Relying on DiMarco, the appellate court reversed after de-
termining that the parties intended it to be an integrated agreement.
Similarly, the trial court in Levy v. Levy 2 held the agreement not in-
tegrated where the payments were designated "for support, care, and
maintenance," and the agreement lacked express recital that the wife
waived her right to future alimony, or to any payment other than
that in the agreement. The appellate court determined that the par-
ties intended an integrated settlement and reversed the trial court
on the authority of DiMarco and Biagi.
As a result of the judicial interpretation in Bradley, DiMarco
and their progeny, the law concerning integrated property settlement
agreements became such that the attorney could not assure his client
that an agreement, settling both property and support rights, was
modifiable upon changed circumstances or enforceable by contempt
proceedings. Consequently, attorneys were reluctant to use an inte-
grated agreement to settle the rights of spouses relating to property
and support.
20 60 Cal. 2d 387, 385 P.2d 2, 33 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1963).
21 Id. at 392, 385 P.2d at 6, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
22 233 Cal. App. 2d 624, 43 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1965).
23 245 Cal. App. 2d 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966).
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Moreover, practical social problems developed when the parties
found themselves "trapped" in an integrated agreement. If the hus-
band was unable to modify the agreement upon changed circum-
stances and refused to pay, the wife was left without effective rem-




In an effort to clarify the law concerning integrated property
settlement agreements after the Bradley decision, section 139 of the
California Civil Code was amended in 1959, 1961, and 1963.24 None
of the amendments were broad enough or explicit enough, however,
to clarify the law and provide for effective enforcement of integrated
agreements.
The present amendment, passed on May 12, 1967, abolishes the
integrated property settlement agreement in its classical form. 5 The
amendment replaces it with guidelines constructed to give effect to
the intention of the parties and maintain the integrated agreement as
an effective means of settling marital obligations.
Whereas the Bradley court, in considering the dual nature of
payments under an integrated agreement, emphasized the contractual
debt nature,26 the new amendment emphasizes the "law imposed" sup-
port nature of the payments. The amendment suggests that, although
to some extent the integrated payments may be a negotiated contrac-
tual debt, inasmuch as the payments under such an agreement satisfy
the legal obligation of marital support and maintenance, they are
"law imposed" alimony, and consequently modifiable by the court in
the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, and are within the
exception 27 to the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt.
If, under the new amendment, the parties want an integrated
24 The 1959 amendment provided for modification of child support orders
based on integrated agreements. CAL. STAT. 1959, ch. 1399. In 1961, the Legislature
gave the courts the power to modify support orders "to the other spouse" based
on integrated agreements, unless "there are no minor children of the parties to the
agreement." CAL. STAT. 1961, ch. 2098. The confusion resulting from the 1961 amend-
ment terminated when it was repealed by the 1963 amendment. CAL. STAT. 1963,
ch. 861. For discussion of the amendments and their effect see Heller v. Heller, 230
Cal. App. 2d 679, 41 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1964) ; 38 CAL. ST. B. J. 637 (1963).
25 Traditionally, the finality, waiver, and consideration clauses had to be pres-
ent. See discussion p. 85 supra.
26 See p. 86 supra.
27 See note 17 supra.
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agreement to be modifiable, the attorney need not mention modifica-
tion in the agreement and the law presumes the intention to make it
modifiable.18 If modification is not desired, a specific statement to
that effect will prevent any modification without consent from both
parties." The guidelines of the amendment eliminate the uncertainty
involved when a court is allowed to determine the intent of the par-
ties to the agreement.
No provision need be inserted in the agreement by the attorney
to protect the right of the spouse to enforce payments by contempt
proceedings. It is advisable, nevertheless, that steps be taken to in-
sure that the agreement is incorporated into the judgment of the
court. This may be best accomplished either by having the agreement
read into the judicial decree, or the performance described in the de-
cree, and the performance specifically ordered by the court with a
copy of the agreement attached to the judgment.8" Incorporated in
this manner, the agreement is merged with the decree of the court
and the payments of the decree can be considered "law imposed" and
within the power of the court to order "allowance for support and
maintenance."'"
In addition, provision should be made in the agreement for the
termination of payments upon the remarriage of the wife. In this way
the payments retain the indicia of support and are not susceptible to
contrary interpretation.
32
Thus, where the finality, waiver, and consideration clauses were
previously required to establish an integrated agreement which was
non-modifiable and enforceable by contempt, under the present law
all that is needed is a specific provision that the agreement is non-
modifiable.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
On the basis of Bradley v. Superior Court,'3 it could be argued
that section 139 of the California Civil Code 4 violates the constitu-
28 "The provisions of any agreement ... shall be subject to subsequent modi-
fication or revocation by court order . . . except to the extent that any written agree-
ment ...specifically provides to the contrary." CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133. See note 6
supra.
29 Id.
30 See generally 34 WASH. L. REV. 196 (1959).
31 CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133. (If the court merely approves the agreement by
reference and orders it performed, the agreement might not be considered so merged
with the judicial decree as to be "law imposed." See Bradley v. Superior Court, 48
Cal. 2d 509, 513, 310 P.2d 634, 636 (1957).)
32 There was no such provision in Bradley, where it was determined that the
payments were not for support.
33 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957).
34 CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133. See note 6 supra.
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tional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. " In providing that
enforcement by contempt is available "even if there has been an
agreement 3" of the parties,"37 section 139 permits imprisonment for
failure to pay a negotiated contractual debt contrary to the supreme
court's holding in Bradley that to do so violates article I section 15
of the California constitution.
The basis of the decision in Bradley is the court's adoption of a
policy of strict interpretation of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt, resolving all doubt in favor of the liberty of
the citizen. 8 Accordingly, where the court can label integrated pay-
ments either alimony or a contractual debt, the court favors that con-
struction which preserves the liberty of the individual. Section 139,
however, implies that the payments under the integrated agreement
will always be interpreted as "law imposed" alimony, and therefore
enforceable through contempt proceedings. 9 Thus, the new amend-
ment may be said to be contrary to the basic constitutional principles
as interpreted by the court in Bradley.4"
Furthermore, in order to make the provision for payment in
an integrated agreement "law imposed," the court must incorporate
the agreement in the judgment so that the agreement will merge
with the decree of the court. If it is not incorporated, it remains
merely a contract between the parties with no judicial sanction.
However, Bradley declares that the integrated payment will not be
enforceable by contempt even though merged in the judgment.4
Finally, it has been argued that the Bradley court implies that
it will not allow contempt proceedings to enforce integrated pay-
ments under an agreement which it is unable to modify upon changed
conditions.42 Accordingly, where the agreement is not modifiable by
3r) CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1953).
36 "Agreement" is interpreted to include integrated property settlement agree-
ments. See note 3 supra.
37 CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133. See note 6 supra.
38 Quoting 11 Am. JuR. Constitutional Law § 327 (1937), Bradley v. Superior
Court declared at 48 Cal. 2d at 519, 310 P.2d at 640: "'As in the case of all con-
stitutional provisions designed to safeguard the liberties of the person, every doubt
should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen in enforcement of the con-
stitutional provision that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.'" See People v.
Power, 159 Cal. App. 2d 869, 324 P.2d 113 (1958); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 204(1) (1956).
39 "All orders for ...support ...shall be deemed law imposed .. . .All such
orders . . . may be enforced ...by contempt .... " CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133 (em-
phasis added).
40 See generally 9 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1957).
41 "Inclusion of such a contract in a judgment for divorce ...cannot support a
commitment to imprisonment for failure to pay the judgment debt." 48 Cal. 2d 509,
521, 310 P.2d 634, 641 (1957).
42 If it were otherwise, the court might be forced to imprison a person for failure
[Vol. 8
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the court without the consent of both parties, there would be no
remedy of contempt. Section 139, however, asserts that the remedy
of contempt is available even though the agreement is made non-
modifiable by the specific provision of the parties.4"
Thus the basic provisions of section 139 would be contrary
to the constitutional determinations and reasoning of the California
Supreme Court as asserted in Bradley v. Superior Court.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Section 139 establishes constitutionally valid guidelines for the
creation, modification, and enforcement of integrated agreements.
Its constitutionality is supported by both formal and substantive
arguments.
Formal Arguments
The constitutionality of section 139 depends on the interpre-
tation of article I section 15 of the California constitution,44 and
the validity of the reasoning and decision of the California Supreme
Court in Bradley v. Superior Court.4"
The use of contempt to enforce recurring payments under an
integrated agreement is in harmony with the rationale behind ar-
ticle I section 15. The constitutional prohibition against imprison-
ment for debt is restricted to the protection of the "poor but honest
debtor who is unable to pay his debts."4 The prohibition does not
intend its use to "shield a dishonest man. 4
If contempt proceedings are brought, the husband is not
automatically incarcerated if he does not pay. It must first be proven
that he has the present ability to make the payments, and that he
to pay under an agreement which the court found manifestly inequitable due to
changed circumstances, such as a new family or loss of job, but which it could not
change. See 47 CALn. L. REV. 756, 757 (1959).
43 "All such orders of the court for the support of the other party, even if there
has been an agreement of the parties, may be enforced by . . . contempt .... " CAL.
STAT. 1967, ch. 133 (emphasis added). See note 6 supra.
44 "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action . . . unless in cases
of fraud .... "
45 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957).
46 "The historical background of section 15 of article I and similar constitutional
guaranties of other states clearly shows that the provisions were adopted to protect
the poor but honest debtor who is unable to pay his debts, and were not intended
to shield a dishonest man who takes unconscionable advantage of another." In re
Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 809, 193 P.2d 734, 740 (1948) (emphasis added); cf.





has not paid.4 8 A valid inability to pay or excuse for not paying is
a good defense to a contempt proceeding. 49 Even where the husband
is incarcerated, however, he may gain his liberty by merely paying
the amount owed. Thus, the "poor but honest debtor" is protected
while the "dishonest man" is incarcerated.
If contempt, in its application, is in harmony with article I
section 15, then the principal objection to section 139 must be found
in its contradiction of Bradley. However, Bradley itself was a con-
tradiction of the law as it had been established twenty years earlier
in Miller v. Superior Court." In Miller the husband appealed a
contempt conviction on the ground that the payments were part of
an integrated agreement and constituted a debt within article I sec-
tion 15. The court declared that, even though the agreement was
integrated, upon incorporation and merger of the agreement with
the judgment, the payments lost their contractual nature and be-
came an "allowance to the wife for her support" under section 139,
and thereby enforceable by contempt.
It is significant that the court in Bradley did not expressly
overrule Miller. Instead, Miller was distinguished. Bradley deter-
mined that the holding in Miller allowed support payments to be en-
forced through contempt." The court then concluded that, since it
was determined in the lower court that the payments in Bradley
were not for support, Miller did not apply.
Aside from the validity of the distinction, it is notable that
Bradley agreed with Miller, that if payments are determined to be
in satisfaction of the marital obligation of support they will be en-
forceable by contempt. 52 Thus, Bradley implied that if the payments
(in Bradley) had been for support they would have been enforceable
by contempt. Therefore, if it is determined that certain payments
are in satisfaction of the marital obligation of support, they will be
enforceable by contempt according to Bradley,53 Miller,5 4 and sec-
tion 139. Accordingly, throughout section 139 reference is made only
to provisions for support or orders for support, providing that only
these are enforceable by contempt. 5
Thus, the key to section 139 lies in the stipulation that the
48 See Darden v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. App. 2d 80, 45 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1965).
41 See Cagwin v. Cagwin, 112 Cal. App. 2d 14, 245 P.2d 379 (1952).
50 9 Cal. 2d 733, 72 P.2d 868 (1937).
51 "[T]he decision in the Miller case actually rested on the theory of marital
support." 48 Cal. 2d 509, 521, 310 P.2d 634, 641.
52 Id. at 520, 310 P.2d at 641.
53 Id.
54 9 Cal. 2d 733, 739, 72 P.2d 868, 872 (1937).
55 CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 113. See note 6 supra.
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support provisions are "deemed to be separate and severable from
the provisions of the agreement relating to property."56 In this way
the amendment separates the integrated agreement at the outset
into those provisions relating to support and those relating to prop-
erty.57 It then provides that only the provisions and orders relating
to support will be enforceable by contempt.18 Hence, the amendment
is in accord with the statement in Bradley that provisions relating
to support may be enforced by contempt, and does not contravene
the holding in Bradley that provisions relating to property are a
debt and not enforceable by contempt.
After distinguishing Miller, the court in Bradley was unable to
find a California case in point.59 Consequently, it cited cases from
Washington, Maryland, and Michigan in support of its decision.
Washington, however, is the only state with a system of law com-
parable to California, including community property.Y° It is therefore
significant that the two Washington cases,6 ' as relied on in Brad-
ley, 62 were overruled a year later in Decker v. Decker.3
In Decker the court upheld contempt to enforce integrated
payments and declared that the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt64 related only to "run-of-the-mill debtor-
creditor relationships"65 where the judgment of the court was
merely a declaration of an amount owing. Problems in domestic
relations were excluded from the debtor-creditor category by the
court because the judgment in such cases is an order by the court
that an amount be paid, not merely a declaration that an amount
is owing.66
56 Id.
57 Where the payments are labeled "support" or "alimony" as in DiMarco, Biagi,
and Levy supra, the court should have no problem dividing the provisions. However,
where the payments are thoroughly integrated and not susceptible -to separation (see
note 13 supra), the amendment does not indicate how the payments for support are
to be determined so that they can be severed from the payments in consideration of
property. It is suggested in this respect that the courts hold all payments under an
integrated agreement as provisions for support.
58 "All such orders of the court for the support of the other party ...may be
enforced by . . . contempt .... " CAL. STAT. 1967, ch. 133 (emphasis added). See
note 6 supra.
59 "No California case has been cited or discovered in which the point has been
squarely presented and passed on." 48 Cal. 2d 509, 520, 310 P.2d 634, 641.
60 See 45 CALIF. L. REV. 782, 784 (1957).
61 Robinson v. Robinson, 37 Wash. 2d 511, 225 P.2d 411 (1950) and Corrigeux
v. Corrigeux, 37 Wash. 2d 403, 224 P.2d 343 (1950).
62 48 Cal. 2d at 519-20, 310 P.2d at 640-41.
63 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
64 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
65 52 Wash. 2d 456, -, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958).
66 Id. The same distinction is pointed out in Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d
733, 739, 72 P.2d 868, 870-71 (1937).
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In obvious reference to Bradley and the cases quoted therein,
the Decker court stated: "Certain language in some marital relations
decisions of this and other courts appears to emphasize unduly the
contractual rights of the parties in the settlement of their marital
difficulties by agreement or contract. '
67
Further indication of the diminished effect Bradley should have
on section 139, is that the 1961 amendment 8 to section 139 was in-
terpreted as permitting contempt to enforce payments under an inte-
grated agreement, and no constitutional issue was raised. Heller v.
Heller69 involved a contempt action, brought under the 1961 amend-
ment, to enforce payment under an integrated agreement. The court
upheld the contempt proceedings against the husband by inter-
preting the 1961 amendment as basing all payments to the wife,
even in an integrated agreement, on the statutory obligation of
marital support.70 This interpretation is the essence of the 1967
amendment. 7' However, rather than pointing to the contractual
nature of the agreement, the Heller court emphasized the state's
interest in the marital relationship, and found no constitutional issue
raised by the amendment as it related to contempt.
In light of the above discussion, section 139 does not violate
the basic purpose of article I section 15. Neither does section 139, as
interpreted, contravene the reasoning and decision in Bradley v.
Superior Court.7 2
Substantive Arguments
An integrated property settlement agreement is not the result
of voluntary bargaining between two people wishing to contract.
The entire agreement arises out of the marital relationship and is
marital in nature. Consequently, it has been argued that there should
be no distinction in an integrated agreement between the contractual
element concerning property and the law-imposed element concern-
67 52 Wash. 2d 456, -, 326 P.2d 332, 336 (1958).
68 The 1961 amendment gave the court the power to modify or revoke support
provisions for the "other spouse" contained in an integrated agreement unless "there
are no minor children of the parties to the agreement." No mention was made in the
amendment concerning enforcement by contempt. CAL. STAT. 1961, ch. 2098.
60 230 Cal. App. 2d 679, 41 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1964).
70 "By the passage of the 1961 amendments, the Legislature deliberately based
the separate maintenance of the wife ...on the statutory obligation of marital sup-
port even in cases of integrated agreements and thus, the support provision became
subject to court modification and enforcement by contempt." 230 Cal. App. 2d at
686, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
71 See note 6 supra.
72 For criticism of Bradley see Armstrong, Family Law: Order Out of Chaos, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 121, 143-50 (1965); 45 CALIF. L. REV. 782 (1957); 34 N.D.L. REV.
170 (1958); 10 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1958).
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ing support.7 3 All obligations satisfied by the agreement arise out of
the marital relationship. As such, all obligations under the agree-
ment should be enforceable by contempt, whether they relate to
property or support.
Moreover, if contempt is not permitted as a means of enforcing
payment under an integrated agreement, the wife is left without an
effective remedy. Her only alternative is to seek execution upon the
contract.
It is generally understood, however, that execution is neither
effective nor practical to enforce recurring payments.74 First, it is
a discretionary remedy. Messenger v. Messenger7 5 held that it was
within the discretion of the court to grant or withhold execution after
consideration of the circumstances.7 6 However, even if execution is
granted, the husband can liquidate the assets which would be at-
tached by the court. In most cases, where the salary is low or the
husband has remarried, his salary is immune from execution be-
cause it is needed for his own or his family's support." Finally, even
though execution is successful, it is still not practical because it does
not accelerate the payments and must therefore be brought peri-
odically. Consequently, the husband may prevail if the wife cannot
afford frequent execution proceedings, and the wife will turn to the
state for her support.
The state therefore has an interest in providing the divorced
wife and children with an effective means of enforcing payments
under an integrated agreement. The state's interest was asserted in
Decker v. Decker78 which upheld contempt on facts similar to
Bradley.
It is clear that the parties to a divorce action cannot foreclose
the public interest in their marital responsibilities by a contract or an
agreement of settlement. Marital problems involve something more
fundamental than nomenclature and technical contract rights. There
is no sound reason for allowing a husband to contract away his duty to
support his wife . . . under the guise of a "property settlement agree-
ment."
79
73 See 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 328, 331 (1959).
74 "[I]t is beyond argument that execution is not a practical method of enforcing
the obligation to make recurring support payments." Armstrong, supra note 72, at 148.
75 46 Cal. 2d 619, 297 P.2d 988 (1956).
76 In Messenger the court withheld execution because the husband was a doctor
and the stigma attached to execution would ruin his business, thus making him not
only unwilling to pay, but also unable. Query: How is the wife to collect the money?
77 See Final Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary Relating
to Domestic Relations, 23 ASSEMBLY INTERIM Commra. REP. 1963-1965, No. 6, at 104
(1965).
78 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
79 Id. at -, 326 P.2d at 337 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
The remedy of contempt is a form of coercion, the threat of
which forces the husband who can pay, to either pay or show cause
why he should not be incarcerated until he does pay. When available
to enforce integrated payments, contempt saves both the state and
the parties time and money.
Execution is a costly and time consuming remedy, is not always
effective, and is not practical where recurring payments are con-
cerned. Consequently, the wife is left without an effective remedy
and must rely on the state for the support of herself and her chil-
dren. This increase in welfare responsibilities creates an interest in
the state in providing an effective remedy.
80
Consequently, the state, upon the urging of the State Bar of
California and numerous legislative and executive committees,"'
passed the 1967 amendment to section 139 of the California Civil
Code. Through section 139 the legislature effectively overrules
Bradley insofar as that case neither effectively promoted the public
welfare nor conformed to established public policy developed during
the twenty years prior to its decision. The legislature asserted the
state's interest in protecting the marital rights of the wife through
encouraging effective settlement prior to divorce and effective en-
forcement of the settlement agreement subsequent to the divorce. 2
Richard J. Dolwig, Jr.
80 "[Plublic policy requires the protection of the wife . . . in a divorce ac-
tion .... " Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 627, 177 P.2d 265, 269 (1947) (Traynor,
J.).
"The state has an interest in the support of the wife, lest she become a public
charge." Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 733, 737, 72 P.2d 868, 872 (1937).
"Since enforcement of [either alimony or property settlement agreements] may
eliminate the possibility of the wife becoming a public charge, both are public in
nature in that the state has an interest." 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 328, 331 (1959). See 26
CALIF. L. REV. 707, 710 (1938) ; 2 STAN. L. REV. 731, 739 (1950).
81 The amendment was sponsored by the State Bar of California and was pre-
viously determined to be in the public interest by the Governor's Commission on
the Family (Dec. 1966) and the Assembly Interim Committee on the Judiciary Re-
lating to Domestic Relations (Jan. 1965).
82 The possibility of the constitutionality of section 139 is increased by the fact
that Mr. Justice McComb is the only member of the six man majority in Bradley
remaining on the court. Mr. Chief Justice Traynor, then Justice, was the lone dis-
senter.
